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Who's Responsible!?
Employer Liability for Supervisors'
Hostile-Environment Sexual Harassment
by BarbaraJ. Fick
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 401-405. © 1998 American Bar Association.

mining employer liability when
supervisory sexual harassment
creates a hostile environment.
It is that issue the Supreme Court
addresses in this case.

Barbara J. Fick is associate
professor of law at
Notre Dame Law School,
Notre Dame, IN;
(219) 631-5864.

ISSUE
What is the appropriate standard
of employer liability for a supervisor's hostile-environment sexual
harassment?
FACTS
Beth Ann Faragher was employed
from September 1985 to May 1990
as an ocean lifeguard by the City of
Boca Raton, Florida (the "City").
She worked part-time and summers
while attending college. During her
term of employment, she and other
female lifeguards were subjected
both to physical touching and verbal
comments of a sexual nature severe
and pervasive enough to create a
hostile work environment. The per-

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") prohibits discrimination in the terms and conditions
of employment based on sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). Sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII
includes sexual harassment as the
Supreme Court held in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986).
There are two types of sexual
harassment. Quid pro quo harassment is unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature in
which the victim's submission is
made the basis for employment
decisions. Hostile-environment
harassment is unwelcome verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature
that creates an abusive and hostile
workplace.

(Continued on Page 402)

BETH ANN FARAGHER V. CITY OF
BOCA RATON, FLORIDA
DOCKET

The federal appeals courts have held
uniformly that employers are strictly liable - liable without fault - for
quid pro quo harassment by their
supervisory personnel, but these
same courts are sharply divided
over the standard to apply in deter-

No. 97-282

ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 25, 1998
FROM: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

401

petrators of the conduct were Bill
Terry and David Silverman.
Terry was Chief of the Marine Safety
Section (the "Safety Section" or the
"Section") of the City's Parks and
Recreation Department. The Safety
Section consisted of all the ocean
lifeguards. Silverman was a lieutenant and, subsequently, a captain
in the Section.
Both men held supervisory positions
with respect to the lifeguards
employed in the Section. As Chief
of the Safety Section, Terry had
authority to interview and recommend applicants for hire; he also
supervised all aspects of the lifeguards' work assignments and was
responsible for discipline and
annual performance evaluations.
Silverman had authority to make
work assignments and disciplinary
decisions and had input on
employee evaluations.
While employed, Faragher complained to Marine Training Captain
Robert Gordon about Terry and
Silverman's sexual harassment.
As a Training Captain, Gordon held
a supervisory position within the
Safety Section. Gordon's response to
Faragher was that there was nothing
he could do and that the City
"didn't care."
No other City official was informed
of the problem until April 1990,
one month before Faragher quit,
when a female coworker wrote a
letter to the City's Director of
Personnel detailing her problems
with Terry and Silverman. The
Personnel Director conducted an
investigation and subsequently
disciplined both men.
The City, at all relevant times, had a
written policy against sexual harassment. However, the City had not
disseminated its policy either to
supervisors or employees of the

Safety Section. Moreover, it did not
have a complaint procedure in place
until after learning of Terry and
Silverman's misconduct.
Faragher sued the City in federal
district court in 1992, alleging
sexual harassment under Title VII.
The district court found Terry and
Silverman's misconduct severe and
pervasive enough to have created
a hostile and abusive work
environment.
The court then determined that
even though the City had no actual
knowledge of the harassment, it was
liable nonetheless based on three
different theories. The first theory
was premised on constructive
knowledge; in the court's view, the
sexually harassing conduct was so
pervasive that it gave rise to an
inference that the City knew what
was happening.
The second theory relied on by the
district court was based on the concept of respondeatsuperior; that is,
in light of the supervisory authority
over the workplace the City gave to
Terry and Silverman, they were acting as the City's agents when they
harassed Faragher and that made
the City liable.
The third theory utilized by the
district court was based on imputed
knowledge. Training Captain
Gordon, by virtue of his supervisory
authority, was an agent of the City.
Because Faragher's complaint
informed Gordon about the harassment, the court concluded that his
knowledge was imputed to the City.
864 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
The City appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit. A three-judge panel of that
court upheld the district court's factual finding that the supervisors'
misconduct created a hostile environment but rejected the holding
that the City was liable for their

misconduct. While agreeing that an
employer can be liable based on a
constructive-knowledge theory, the
court held that the facts in this case
were not sufficient to prove such
knowledge. Just because sexual
harassment is pervasive cannot by
itself justify a finding that the
employer should have known that
the harassment was occurring. In
this case, said the panel, the lifeguards' work site was remote from
the seat of City management, and
there was very little contact
between the lifeguards and City
management. Accordingly, there
was no factual basis to conclude
that the City should have known
what was happening on the beach.
The Eleventh Circuit panel also
rejected the respondeat superior
rationale. The panel held that a
mere showing that an individual is
acting as an agent for a third party
is not sufficient to attach liability
to the third party. It also must be
shown that either the agent was acting within the scope of employment
when committing the complained-of
act or that the agent was assisted in
committing the act by the agency
relationship. According to the panel,
there was no evidence in the record
to support either contention.
The panel then rejected the district
court's view that Gordon's knowledge could be imputed to the City
on the ground that he was not a
high management official of the
City. 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996).
Faragher petitioned for a rehearing
in banc (see Glossary), and the
petition was granted. Faragher,
however, lost again; a seven-judge
majority essentially agreed with the
panel's decision that the City was
not liable for Terry and Silverman's
hostile-environment sexual
harassment. 111 F.3d 1530
(11th Cir. 1996).

Issue No. 6

The Supreme Court granted
Faragher's petition for a writ of
certiorari to address the question of
employer liability for a supervisor's
hostile-environment sexual harassment. 118 S. Ct. 438 (1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in Meritor
declined to establish a definitive
rule for employer liability for supervisory sexual harassment in the
hostile-environment context. It did,
however, suggest that employers
should not be held strictly liable
and instructed "courts [to] look to
agency principles for guidance,"
keeping in mind that such "principles may not be transferable in all
their particulars to Title VII ..
477 U.S. at 72.
Courts and litigants since Meritor
have advanced several theories for
imposing liability on employers for
hostile-environment harassment by
supervisory-level personnel. These
theories can be grouped into two
categories: direct liability and indirect liability. Under the direct-liability theories, the lower courts uniformly agree an employer is liable
for supervisory harassment if it
knew or should have known of the
supervisor's misconduct and failed
to take appropriate steps to stop it.
Disagreements arise, however,
over what constitutes actual or
constructive (should have known)
knowledge.
Faragher argues that an employer is
charged with the knowledge of an
agent concerning any matter as to
which the agent has a duty to
inform the employer. It is irrelevant
how the agent acquired the knowledge, e.g., that the agent was
informed in his or her capacity
as an agent or as a friend of the
informant.

It also is irrelevant, says Faragher,
whether the agent actually informed
the employer; the agent's knowledge
is imputed to the employer, i.e., it is
effectively the employer's knowledge. According to Faragher, when
she informed Gordon that Terry and
Silverman had harassed her, that
information constituted actual
notice to the City.
Faragher maintains that the
Eleventh Circuit's requirement that
an employee must complain to high
officials not only misstates agency
law but ignores the reality of the
workplace. Given the justified fear
of retaliation with respect to reporting workplace sexual harassment, it
is both likely and reasonable that
the victim would be more comfortable informing an agent known to
the complainant or someone close
to the complainant's own level, such
as an immediate supervisor. Given
Gordon's supervisory authority,
Faragher contends it was reasonable
for her to believe he was authorized
to receive workplace complaints.
The City responds by asserting that
Faragher spoke to Gordon as a
friend, not a supervisor, and she
did not expect him to pass her
complaint along. Moreover, says
the City, Gordon made it clear that
he would not be doing so. Under
agency principles, knowledge cannot be imputed to the employer if it
is clear that the employee knows
the agent will not notify the
employer.
Faragher replies that the City can
be charged at least with constructive knowledge because the harassment was so pervasive that the City
should have known about it.
Moreover, if the City did not know
about Terry and Silverman's misconduct, it is because it intentionally remained ignorant.

Faragher supports her position by
pointing to agency-law principles
requiring employers to exercise
reasonable care to prevent harm to
employees. In Faragher's view, sexual harassment in the workplace is a
known and foreseeable problem,
and the City's failure to disseminate
and enforce an effective antiharassment policy indicates a failure to exercise reasonable care,
thereby creating constructive
knowledge.
The City agrees that constructive
knowledge can exist if a reasonable
employer would have been aware of
a supervisor's misconduct. But,
argues the City, the mere fact that
sexual harassment is pervasive
enough to create a hostile environment does not mean a reasonable
employer would be aware of it.
According to the City, such
circumstances as the location of
the harassment and its duration and
frequency must be considered in
deciding what a reasonable employer should know.
The City argues that in this case the
sexual harassment occurred intermittently, over a period of years, at
a location remote from City officials. These factors, says the City,
militate against a finding that it had
constructive knowledge.
Addressing its alleged lack of a
sexual-harassment policy, the City
maintains that Title VII does not
impose a duty on an employer to
disseminate such a policy.
Accordingly, the failure to do so
cannot form the basis for employer
liability under Title VII.
The second group of theories dealing with employer responsibility for
supervisory-level sexual harassment
can be categorized as indirect liability. Indirect liability is based on the
premise that when a principal
(Continued on Page 404)
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(either an individual or an entity)
employs a person to act on its
behalf (the agent), the principal is
liable for the agent's acts.
Entities such as businesses or
municipal governments can act only
through individuals. Thus, when
such an entity hires a person to be a
supervisor, the entity can be liable
for the supervisor's misconduct
vis-A-vis its employees.
The principal is not absolutely liable
for all the acts of its agent, however,
and three factors limit a principal's
indirect liability. The principal is
liable when the agent (1) acts within the scope of his or her employment; (2) acts outside the scope of
his or her employment, but the
agent purports to act on behalf of
the principal, and others relied on
this apparent authority; or (3) is
aided in perpetrating the misconduct in question by the existence
of his or her agency authority.
Faragher contends that Terry and
Silverman acted within the scope of
their employment as supervisors.
The City gave them broad authority
over its lifeguard employees with
the discretion to use that authority
to direct and control their work and
workplace conditions.
Terry and Silverman proceeded to
use their supervisory authority to
create a hostile work environment.
In Faragher's view, the mere fact
that the City did not specifically
authorize the harassing conduct or
that the misconduct itself was illegal
does not place the misconduct
outside the scope of employment.
The City asserts that the scope-ofemployment theory requires an
agent's acts to be tied closely to
what the agent was hired to do and
be in furtherance of the employer's
interest. Conduct bearing no rela-

tion to the work the agent was hired
to perform is outside the scope of
employment.
The City argues that supervisors
who create a hostile work environment are pursuing their own agendas. Sexually inappropriate physical
or verbal conduct does not further
the job for which supervisors are
hired nor does it promote an
employer's interests. As such, it
cannot serve as the basis for
employer liability.
Faragher asserts that Terry and
Silverman had apparent authority to
create a hostile environment, and
the City is liable for that reason.
A supervisor, by virtue of his or her
authority in the workplace, possesses leverage and power over employees. The supervisor need not explicitly remind the employees of this
power; employees are well aware of
it. In the absence of a disseminated
and effectively enforced antiharassment policy, it is reasonable for
employees to believe that the
supervisor's harassing conduct is
tolerated or even condoned by the
employer and thus within the supervisor's authority. That is
sufficient, argues Faragher, to hold
the City liable.
The City disagrees and argues that
for apparent authority to exist, the
employer must have done something to give employees a reasonable basis to believe the supervisor
had authority to engage in sexual
harassment. Some affirmative act by
the employer is required. Argues the
City, the lack of a policy against
sexual harassment is not such an
affirmative act. Moreover, no reasonable employee could believe that
an employer has authorized a
supervisor to engage in sexual
harassment.
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Faragher claims in closing that
employer liability is appropriate
when a supervisor is aided in perpetrating harassment by the existence
of the authority he or she possesses
through the employer-supervisor
agency relationship. In many cases,
a supervisor's authority in the workplace facilitates the ability to harass;
the employee-victim reasonably
believes there will be retaliation if a
complaint is made.
Harassment is about power, argues
Faragher, and the employee who is
the victim of supervisory harassment often is powerless to object.
A determination that supervisory
authority assists the supervisor in
engaging in harassment is based on
the facts of each case - the extent
and nature of the supervisor's
powers, the circumstances of the
harassment, and the efficacy of the
employer's antiharassment policy.
In this case, argues Faragher,
Terry and Silverman possessed
the authority to control her work
assignments and were in a position
to make effective recommendations
concerning discipline and pay raises. Because of this power, it was reasonable, says Faragher, for her to
believe that. Terry and Silverman
would use their authority to retaliate against her if she objected,
particularly since the City never
communicated to employees that
sexual-harassment complaints
would be taken seriously and that
those who complained would be
protected from retaliation.
The City counters that apparent
authority aids the supervisor's sexual harassment only when the supervisor affirmatively capitalizes on
'that authority. That a supervisor has
authority does not mean it was used
to harass. According to the City,
Faragher wrongly focuses on
whether the employee-victim reasonably fears that the harassing

Issue No. 6

supervisor will use that authority to
harass. The correct focus, argues
the City, is whether the supervisor
actually used his or her authority
for that purpose.
Several friends of the court supporting the City propose a standard for
employer liability based on the existence of an antiharassment policy. If
an employer has an effective, widely
disseminated, and uniformly
enforced policy, it cannot be held
liable for supervisory hostileenvironment sexual harassment
unless (1) the victim utilizes the
policy's complaint mechanisms or
(2) the employer has actual knowledge of the supervisor's conduct and
failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
SIGNIFICANCE
The magnitude of the problem of
sexual harassment is such that
whenever the Supreme Court confronts the issue, its decision will
have an immediate and widespread
impact. Studies indicate that
between 40 and 90 percent of all
working women have experienced
sexual harassment during their
careers. A study of the federal
workplace for the Merit System
Protection Board, an executive
branch agency, stated that victims
of sexual harassment lose $4.4 million in wages annually.
The lower federal courts are almost
unanimous in holding that individual agents of an employer are not
personally liable under Title VII.
This means that victims of hostileenvironment sexual harassment
cannot sue the individual supervisor
under Title VII for damages (see
Glossary) caused by the supervisor's
harassment. If the employer is not
held liable for the conduct of its
supervisors, victims risk being
uncompensated for their injuries.
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According to a Fortune 500 study,
almost two-thirds of all sexualharassment complaints are brought
against supervisory personnel or
another person with greater workplace power than the victim. Given
the frequency with which it appears
supervisors sexually harass employees, imposition of employer liability
likely will result in an increase in
claims and lead to unforeseen and,
perhaps, unpredictable monetary
costs.
On the other hand, if employers
realize they can be held liable for
supervisory hostile-environment
harassment, this would create a
powerful incentive to develop and
disseminate antiharassment policies
and more effectively police the
workplace to prevent such misconduct. The result certainly would
serve the deterrent purpose
inherent in Title VII.
Adding to the crosscurrents, free
speech advocates are concerned
that heightened policing efforts will
cause employers to prohibit and
punish speech that does not rise to
the level of harassment on the theory of "better safe than sorry." It's
apparent that whatever the outcome
here, the standard of employer liability the Court establishes will have
a far-reaching impact on the
American workplace.
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